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Abstract
This article examines the evolving role of the Ottoman navy in the mid-eighteenth cen-
tury in protecting Ottoman seas from maritime violence. Despite enjoying a general 
peace with its European neighbors, merchant shipping in the waters of the eastern 
Mediterranean and coastal settlements were frequently subject to seaborne violence 
from European privateers, Maltese corsairs, and domestic pirates. Based on extensive 
research in the Ottoman archives, this article analyzes the development of the policy 
of protection (muḥāfaẓa) through defensive naval patrols, which occurred in conjunc-
tion with a strengthening of coastal fortifications and the implementation of innovative 
legal measures. The aims of this protective policy were to protect domestic and interna-
tional trade, and to demonstrate imperial authority in Ottoman waters both in response 
to a demand for protection from subjects in the provinces from local and foreign vio-
lence, and as part of strengthening and consolidating Ottoman maritime territoriality 
in the Mediterranean.
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Mediterranean – Ottoman Empire – maritime territoriality – maritime space piracy – 
maritime violence
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 Introduction
In January 1748, a ceremony was held marking the relaunch of the flagship 
Naṣr-ı Baḥrī (Victory of the Sea) after major repairs in the Istanbul dockyards.1 
Destined for the Mediterranean, its mission was to protect seas in great tur-
moil, with British privateers assaulting French shipping in the waters around 
Crete and Syria resulting in huge losses for Ottoman merchants freighting 
their goods, whilst Maltese corsairs and Maniot pirates were raiding coastal 
settlements and islands, stealing produce and enslaving the inhabitants. The 
Ottoman reaction was, in part through the use of ships like the Naṣr-ı Baḥrī, 
to ensure Baḥr-ı Sefīd muḥāfaẓası, the protection of the Mediterranean. Given 
the impossibility of physically imposing permanent territorial claims over 
liquid territory, the Ottoman state bolstered regular naval patrols alongside 
improved coastal fortifications and new legal practices to ensure peace and 
security in its waters. This required a significant investment in manpower, pro-
visions, and armaments, as well as cooperation with the provincial authorities. 
The Mediterranean Sea was therefore a space of intense imperial interest and 
immense territorial importance in the mid-eighteenth century. 
The Ottoman Mediterranean has also been a space of increasing histo-
riographical importance. In a number of ways, histories of the Ottoman 
Mediterranean still live with the legacy of Fernand Braudel’s La Méditerranée 
et le monde méditerranéen à l’époque de Philippe II, particularly his idea of 
l’intrusion nordique—the Northern Invasion—that marked a period of grow-
ing northern European political and economic domination from the seven-
teenth century at the expense of the Mediterranean powers, including the 
Ottomans.2 The Braudelian paradigm of examining the Mediterranean as a 
unit was  further developed in Faruk Tabak’s The Waning of the Mediterranean, 
1550-1870, a significant piece of scholarship that brought a vast Mediterranean 
history onto an even wider global scale, which nonetheless saw the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries as a period of decline.3 It is the continuing connec-
tivity and interculturality of the Mediterranean, not least the eastern part, that 
has seen Braudel’s assessment of the seventeenth century subject to varying 
1   Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivleri (Prime Ministry’s Ottoman Archives, Istanbul, BOA), Cevdet 
Tasnifi, Bahriye (Cevdet Series, Naval, C.BH.) 146/6983 (19 Şaban 1160 / 26 August 1747); 
C.BH.76/3647 (20 Muharrem 1161/ 3 January 1748).
2   Fernand Braudel, La Méditerranée et le monde méditerranéen à l’époque de Philippe II 
(Paris, 1982), vol. 1, esp. 578-580.
3   Faruk Tabak, The Waning of the Mediterranean, 1550-1870: A Geohistorical Approach (Baltimore, 
2008), esp. 165-185, 210-216.
degrees of reassessment and development in recent decades through specific 
case-studies, from Molly Greene’s studies on the changing nature of corsair-
ing to Daniel Panzac on la caravane maritime that demonstrated the growing 
role of European freighters in Ottoman commerce in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries.4 The legacy of this Northern Invasion continues into 
the eighteenth century, a period treated somewhat unevenly either in terms 
of a legacy of the seismic shifts of the seventeenth or a presage of even more 
profound changes in the nineteenth.5 Another sort of approach to this period, 
beyond Braudel or Tabak’s economic and climatic longue durées has been sug-
gested by Colin Heywood, with microhistories of individual stories and inci-
dents enabling a prosopographic approach to provide a human balance to the 
great economic narratives.6 The answer, as Maria Fusaro suggests, is to com-
bine such histories of  the Mediterranean with histories in the Mediterranean.7 
When thinking about the Ottoman Mediterranean in context of wider 
developments, and with individual cases from the historical record being 
examined, what marks the eighteenth century as different is a new form of 
Northern Invasion with the presence of European privateers in the Eastern 
4   For an important overview of Braudel’s legacy, see: Maria Fusaro, “After Braudel: A reassess-
ment of Mediterranean history between the Northern Invasion and the caravane maritime” in 
Trade and Cultural Exchange in the Early Modern Mediterranean: Braudel’s Maritime Legacy, 
ed. Maria Fusaro, Colin Heywood and Mohamed-Salah Omri (London/New York, 2010), 
1-22. Molly Greene, “Beyond the Northern Invasion: The Mediterranean in the Seventeenth 
Century,” Past & Present 174 (2002): 42-71; Molly Greene, “ ‘Victims of piracy?’: Ottoman law-
suits in Malta (1602-1687) and the changing course of Mediterranean maritime history” 
in Trade and Cultural Exchange, ed. Fusaro et al, 177-202; Daniel Panzac, “International 
and Domestic Maritime Trade in the Ottoman Empire during the Eighteenth Century,” 
International Journal of Middle East Studies 24 (1992): 189-206; Daniel Panzac, La caravane 
maritime: Marins européens et marchands ottomans en Méditerranée, 1680-1830 (Paris, 2004); 
Daniel Panzac, “Plague and seafaring in the Ottoman Mediterranean in the eighteenth cen-
tury,” in Trade and Cultural Exchange, ed. Fusaro et al, 45-68.
5   Molly Greene, “The Ottomans in the Mediterranean” in The Early Modern Ottomans: 
Remapping the Empire, ed. Virginia Aksan and Daniel Goffman (Cambridge, 2007), 61-74; 
Daniel Panzac, “La géostratégie navale de l’Empire ottomane (des origines à l’apparition 
du cuirassé)” in Mutazioni e permanenze nella sotria navale del Mediterraneo secc. XVI-XIX, 
ed. Guido Candiani and Lucca Lo Basso (Milan, 2010); 103-110. Tuncay Zorlu, Innovation and 
Empire in Turkey: Sultan Selim III and the Modernisation of the Ottoman Navy (London/New 
York, 2008).
6   Colin Heywood, “The English in the Mediterranean, 1600-1630: A post-Braudelian perspective 
on the ‘Northern Invasion’,” in Trade and Cultural Exchange, ed. Fusaro et al., 23-44, esp. 23-31.
7   Fusaro, “After Braudel,” 2-4.
Mediterranean, resulting in new Ottoman legal and strengthened naval 
responses to the violence they committed.8
The extent of the ability of the Ottomans to respond to maritime violence 
has been the subject of some discussion, with Edhem Eldem arguing that they 
were forced to abandon its seas to pirates, domestic and foreign, and foreign 
naval forces by the second half of the eighteenth century.9 By contrast, Yusuf 
Alperen Aydın has demonstrated that the Ottoman state in the Aegean used a 
variety of strategies, from fortification building to naval patrols, to defend those 
waters, emphasizing the great expense that these measures brought upon the 
imperial treasury.10 These two studies have delineated the eighteenth- century 
Ottoman Mediterranean as a contested space by presenting two oppos-
ing conclusions, with the first emphasizing a timid retreat of an outdated 
Ottoman fleet to the safety of coastal waters in part in response to encroaching 
Europeans, and the second a huge but financially crippling project of invest-
ment in naval and coastal countermeasures with some limited success. 
The questions raised by these studies are crucial in giving the eighteenth 
century a more considered place in Ottoman history, particularly in terms of 
questions of military strength and foreign relations. Military weaknesses and 
failures in particular have played a role in propping up the widely-discredited 
“decline” narrative, and the history of the Ottoman navy has been crucial to 
this, first (as the story goes) with the defeat at Lepanto in 1571, then a gen-
eral technological decline leading to European supremacy by the start of the 
eighteenth century during which a terminal rot set in, evidenced by disas-
ter at the Battle of Çeşme in 1770, and followed in the nineteenth century by 
inevitable collapse witnessed by defeats to the Greeks at Gerontas (1824); to 
a British, French, and Russian fleet at Navarino (1827); and at Sinop to the 
Russians (1853).11 Focus on these defeats has lost sight of Ottoman attitudes to 
8    Edhem Eldem, “Strangers in their own seas? The Ottomans in the eastern Mediterranean 
basin in the second half of the eighteenth century,” Studi Settencenteschi 29-30 (2010): 
25-58; Michael Talbot, “Ottoman seas and British privateers: Defining maritime territorial-
ity in the eighteenth-century Levant” in Well-Connected Domains: Towards an Entangled 
Ottoman History (Leiden, 2014), 54-70.
9    Eldem, “Strangers,” 52.
10   Yusuf Alperen Aydın, 18. Yüzyılda Osmanlı Devleti’nin Ege (Adalar) Denizi ve Doğu 
Akdeniz’e Yönelik Güvenlik Parametreleri’, Osmanlı Araştırmaları / The Journal of 
Ottoman Studies 45 (2015): 161-184.
11   On the sea specifically, see: Palmira Brummett, “The Ottomans as a World Power: What 
We Don’t Know about Ottoman Sea-Power,” Oriente Moderno 20 (2001): 1-21. More gen-
erally: Dana Sajdi, “Decline, its Discontents and Ottoman Cultural History: By way of 
Introduction” in Dana Sajdi, ed., Ottoman Tulips, Ottoman Coffee (London/New York, 
the Mediterranean in the eighteenth century in particular, which centered on 
defining and defending territorial waters. Just as Palmira Brummett’s seminal 
study on the sixteenth-century maritime setting placed the Ottomans within 
a wider entangled commercial and political sphere in its own right beyond 
simplifications of an “Islamic” or “military” state to be undone by the European 
colonial project, I hope here to show that in this crucial period of the middle 
decades of the eighteenth century, often overlooked in the historiography 
in part because of those later naval defeats, the Ottoman state was active in 
developing legal and naval strategies aimed at protecting its commercial and 
political position in the Mediterranean.12 As such, the Ottoman navy did more 
than simply guard merchant ships and fight pirates in the eighteenth century; 
protection was part of territoriality.13 More importantly, I hope to challenge 
the idea that the Ottoman Empire ceased responding to threats to its maritime 
sovereignty in the second half of the eighteenth century, and that the open 
sea, however that may be defined, became off-limits to them.14 Rather, through 
continuing naval patrols and new legal measures, the eighteenth century was 
a key moment in the Ottoman attempt, however unsuccessful, to protect its 
maritime and littoral subjects and interests.
This paper is based on an extensive analysis of a significant body of hun-
dreds of Ottoman archival documents from the administrative records of the 
Ottoman state relating to the navy in the Prime Ministry’s Ottoman Archives 
in Istanbul (Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivleri) from the late seventeenth to late 
eighteenth centuries, primarily financial records relating to provisioning and 
salaries, commands to admirals and correspondence with the provinces, peti-
tions, and official memoranda, all examined for ideas of muḥāfaẓa—a term 
meaning protection, defense, or guarding—with regard to the Mediterranean.15 
2014), 1-40; Jonathan Grant, “Rethinking the Ottoman Decline: Military Technology 
Diffusion in the Ottoman Empire, Fifteenth to Eighteenth Centuries,” Journal of World 
History 10 (1999): 179-201.
12   Palmira Brummett, Ottoman Seapower and Levantine Diplomacy in the Age of Discovery 
(Albany, 1994), 3-5, 134.
13   Aydın, “Güvenlik Parametreleri,” 161.
14   Eldem, “Strangers,” 52.
15   The term muḥāfaẓa also has an administrative connotation, with a muḥāfıẓ being a com-
mander responsible for the protection of a province or city. The records of the Ottoman 
state to which I refer are a mixture of narrative, discursive, and financial papers, and often 
with features of all three on one document. Primarily taken from the archival series orga-
nized by the Ottoman historians Ahmed Cevdet Paşa (1822-1895), Ali Emiri (1857-1924), 
and İbnülemin Mahmud Kemal (İnal) (1870-1957), they show the workings of the Ottoman 
administration, and those on the navy have links with a variety of departments of state. 
A number of the examples cited here are exceptional cases that represent a 
shift in attitudes or a particularly illustrative case, but most are picked as rep-
resentative documents from this large tranche of often formulaic financial and 
administrative records. By considering them as a whole, examining changes 
and developments over several decades, I have attempted to reconstruct these 
Ottoman efforts to assert their authority in their Mediterranean waters, and to 
assess the development of muḥāfaẓa as a distinctive policy of maritime pro-
tection. In tracing the growing investment in naval patrols between the Treaty 
of Passarowitz of 1718 and the Battle of Çeşme of 1770, together with new 
legal measures aimed at halting foreign violence, this article will show that 
the Ottoman state was not a passive observer of violence in its Mediterranean 
waters, taking extensive and expensive—if not always successful—actions to 
ensure the freedom of movement of merchant ships and the safety of its lit-
toral subjects.16 
In reacting to the complaints of Ottoman officials and subjects through-
out the Mediterranean, three major approaches were taken by the Ottoman 
state. The first was the strengthening of coastal defenses by building new forti-
fications and repairing old ones, and reinforcing and enlarging garrisons where 
necessary.17 The second, specifically as a measure to halt attacks by müsteʾmin 
 privateers—that is, the privateers of states in treaty with the Ottoman 
Empire—was to institute a new legal space across the Mediterranean during 
the European wars within which all acts of violence were liable to prosecu-
tion, referred to by the Ottomans as şurūṭ-u deryā and by the British as the 
maritime regulations.18 The third was the development of muḥāfaẓa (protec-
tion) missions, which had their roots in corsairing voyages (ḳorsanlıḳ) where 
a set number of ships would cruise (geşt ve güzār etmek) in certain regions 
For instance, the documents detailing expenditure on naval provisions for a protection 
mission contain a petition for the provisions, a summary of the case with requests for 
direction, queries and endorsements by senior officials from a number of departments, 
and calculations and receipts written in the distinctive siyakat accounting script by the 
state clerks.
16   On maritime space, see: Colin Heywood, “Ottoman territoriality versus maritime usage: 
The Ottoman islands and English privateering in the wars with France, 1689-1714” in 
Insularités ottomanes, ed. Nicolas Vatin and Gilles Veinstein (Paris, 2004), 145-173, and 
“A Frontier Without Archaeology? The Ottoman Maritime Frontier in the Western 
Mediterranean, 1660-1760” in The Frontiers of the Ottoman World, ed. A.C.S. Peacock 
(London, 2009), 493-508.
17   Annon Cohen, “Ottoman rule and the re-emergence of the coast of Palestine,” Revue de 
l’Occident musulman et de la Médierannée 39 (1995): 163-175.
18   Talbot, “Ottoman seas.”
of the Mediterranean to act as a deterrent and as visible sign of Ottoman 
authority in claimed territorial waters (ṣular). Initially a response to the risk 
of incursions by enemy fleets, a steady build-up of piracy and corsairing in 
the eastern Mediterranean in the 1730s led to the bolstering of regular naval 
patrols along the coasts and in the open seas. By the 1760s, these patrols were 
not reactive but institutionalized as seasonal missions. Whether the threat 
came from a Morean pirate, a Maltese corsair, or a British privateer, the prob-
lem required the regular presence of the imperial fleet in the Mediterranean to 
act as a deterrent and, where necessary, to apprehend or destroy hostile ships. 
As well as representing a specific response to the threats posed to Ottoman 
commerce, international trade, and the safety of Ottoman subjects living in 
coastal settlements, and to the requests for help from Ottoman officials, mer-
chants, and coastal subjects in the provinces, the material and legal dimen-
sions of muḥāfaẓa gave the Ottoman state the opportunity to enforce claims 
over maritime territory.
Territoriality, Piracy, and Muḥāfaẓa, 1718-1739
The defining theme of the period under examination is the growing presence 
of European privateers, along with existing corsairs and domestic pirates, at 
a time of political and diplomatic transition and occasional economic hard-
ship, all of which drove the Ottoman state to build regular naval patrols to 
secure its maritime territory, trade and shipping routes, and to protect its sub-
jects in conjunction with extraordinary legal measures. However, the dates 
used to mark this study are not fixed chronological boundaries, but mark a 
convergence of two key developments in the enhanced use of naval patrols 
to protect coastal areas and maritime trade routes, and the implementation 
of new legal practices aimed at preventing violence in Ottoman waters dur-
ing the European wars, both part of a legacy of a heightened sense of territo-
riality, maritime or otherwise, after the negotiated peace settlements of the 
late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. This is also a period referred 
to in one study as a time of pax Ottomana, with no major fleet engagements 
in the Mediterranean between the Ottomans and their major enemies between 
the battles with Venice in the summer of 1717 and those with the Russians in 
the summer of 1770.19 However, this period of supposed peace was marked by 
19   Daniel Panzac, “Osmanlı Donanması: Başlangıçdan Nizâm-ı Cedid’e Kadar (14-18 
Yüzyıllar)” in Osmanlı Donanmasının Seyir Defteri: Gemiler, Efsaneler, Denizciler, 
ed. Ekrem Işın (Istanbul, 2009), 16-31 at 28.
increasing attempts to define and manage frontiers in both the Mediterranean 
and the Adriatic in legal and naval terms following the conflicts and treaties 
of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries.20 
The Ottoman-Venetian/Habsburg war that began in 1714 was concluded 
by the Treaty of Passarowitz in 1718, a treaty that focused strongly on the delin-
eation and confirmation of sovereign space. In the preceding two decades, 
there had been a fundamental shift in the relations between the Ottoman 
Empire and its western neighbors, a major constituent of which had been the 
formal setting of demarcated borders, first in the Treaty of Carlowitz in 1699, 
and then in Passarowitz, leading to new ideas of fixed spaces that marked 
Ottoman versus non-Ottoman.21 On land, there were border commissions, 
inspections, and landmarks to ensure that space was clearly defined. At sea, 
however, things were rather different. The idea that the Ottoman state could 
demarcate and enforce its law upon an abstract space had arisen in part in 
reaction to the violence perpetrated by British and French privateers in and 
around Ottoman ports and coastal waters during the Nine Years’ War (1688-
1697).22 In 1696, the Ottomans had instituted maritime regulations intended 
to make the entire Aegean out of bounds to foreign fighting vessels in order 
to protect Ottoman subjects, ports, and waters, with a line drawn across the 
Aegean beyond which violence was forbidden and compensation demanded 
for violations.23 That this important legal development occurred at the same 
time in the early eighteenth century as the drawing of law-codes (ḳānūnnāme), 
especially that of the admiral Mezamorta Hüseyin Pasha in 1701 to reform 
Ottoman naval organization, shows this was part of a wider trend of innovative 
20   On the Adriatic, see: Egidio Ivetic, “The Peace of Passarowitz in Venice’s Balkan Policy” in 
The Peace of Passarowitz, 1718, ed. Charles Ingrao and Nicola Samardžić (West Lafayette 
IN, 2011). On later developments after the collapse of Venetian power: Kahraman Şakul, 
“Osmanlılar Fransız İhtilali’ne Karşı: Adriyatik ve İtalya Sularında Osmanlı Donanması” in 
Nizam-ı Kadim’den Nizam-ı Cedid’e: III. Selim ve Dönemi (Istanbul, 2010), 255-315.
21   Rifaat A. Abou-El-Haj, “The Formal Closure of the Ottoman Frontier in Europe, 1699-1703,” 
Journal of the American Oriental Society 89 (1969): 467-475. Carlowitz is about to undergo a 
long-overdue reassessment: Colin Heywood and Ivan Parvev, eds., From War to Peace: The 
Ottoman ‘Long War’ with the Lega Sacra Powers, 1683-1699 (Leiden, forthcoming).
22   See: Colin Heywood, “The Kapudan Pasha, the English Ambassador, and the Blackham 
Frigate: An Episode in Anglo-Ottoman maritime relations (1697),” in The Kapudan 
Pasha, His Office and His Domain: Proceedings of the 4th Halcyon Days Conference, ed. 
E. Zachariadou (Rethymno, 2002), 409-438.
23   Talbot, “Ottoman Seas,” 59-64.
maritime thought.24 Crucially, the extension of Ottoman authority out into the 
open sea did not represent a permanent claim to authority, but a temporary 
measure to ensure security in Ottoman territorial waters, defined as being up 
to three miles from the shoreline. 
In some respects, these new naval tactics might be representative of an 
empire under siege, to borrow Virginia Aksan’s term, who argues in her impor-
tant study that, following the conquest of Crete in 1669, the Ottoman state 
relied more on land-based defensive systems than on its fleet, a view backed 
up by Molly Greene’s research on Crete in the later seventeenth century.25 
Certainly, a great deal of effort and expense went into constructing or repair-
ing coastal fortifications, and, prior to 1718, the term muḥāfaẓa was most com-
monly used to refer to the strengthening of fortifications or the defense of a 
castle during a siege, or, if water was involved, to protecting strategic rivers 
like the Danube.26 The maritime regulations, in establishing a buffer zone, 
were themselves a legal kind of fortification. The growing investment in naval 
patrols as a major duty of the Ottoman fleet in this period therefore denotes a 
developing sense of territorial space in the Mediterranean, one that required 
the same protective care as the fortresses that marked Ottoman military and 
political authority across the empire, but also carries with it a definite con-
notation of defensive protection. That is, at the same time as these fixed land 
borders and set maritime spaces were being recognized, the Ottoman state 
became more assertive in protecting its waters from violence, increasingly at 
the instigation of littoral subjects. 
In previous decades, the primary function of the Ottoman navy in the 
Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean had been in engaging foreign navies dur-
ing the wars, chasing and fighting the various Christian corsairs who raided 
24   Yusuf Alperen Aydın, “Reform of the Ottoman navy and Ottoman superiority at sea (1701-
1718)” in Guido and Lo Basso, Mutazioni e permanenze, 163-179; İdris Bostan, “Kadırga’dan 
kalyon’a: XVII. yüzyılın ikinci yarısında Osmanlı gemi teknolojisinin değişimi,” Journal of 
Ottoman Studies 24 (2004): 65-86; İdris Bostan, “Mezamorta Hüseyin Paşa ve 1701 Tarihli 
Bahriye Kanunnamesi” in İdris Bostan and Salih Özbaran, eds., Başlangıçtan XVII. Yüzyılın 
Sonuna Kadar Türk Denizcilik Tarihi 1 (Istanbul, 2009), 281-291, esp. 284-288.
25   Virginia Aksan, Ottoman Wars, 1700-1870: An Empire under Siege (Abingdon/New York, 
2007), 9; Molly Greene, “Ruling an Island Without a Navy: A Comparative View of Venetian 
and Ottoman Crete,” Oriente Moderno 20 (2001): 193-207, esp. 205-7.
26   BOA/C.BH.181/8494 (25 Şaban 1110 / 26 February 1699). See: Rossita Gradeva, “War and 
Peace along the Danube: Vidin at the end of the seventeenth century,” Oriente Moderno 
20(81), no. 1 (2001), 149-175.
Ottoman waters, and collecting taxes from the island communities.27 The 
growing investment in protection after 1718 seems to reflect new ideas of 
 spatial authority on the part of the state requiring a new level of engagement 
with its subjects, and as a means of consolidation after the recapture of Morea 
in 1715—itself frequently referred to as an island (cezīre)—and the naval con-
flict against Venice in the Aegean, both of which resulted in the formal settling 
of both maritime and land borders in the Adriatic.28 This is not to say that 
prior to ideas of fixed sovereignty confirmed in 1718 the Ottoman state had 
been laissez-faire with regard to maritime security, with operations described 
as muḥāfaẓa carried out by the Ottoman navy in Crete in 1695, Salonica in 1702, 
the Aegean islands in 1706, and Alexandria in 1709.29 Indeed, an examination 
of earlier Ottoman records from the sixteenth and seventeenth century show 
the importance of muḥāfaẓa through naval missions and patrols as an estab-
lished practice, from the command issued to the provincial governors of Aydın 
and Saruhan to give logistical support to a certain Mehmed Bey engaged in 
protecting the sea (deryā muḥāfaẓa) in the Aegean in 1560, to more detailed 
commands later on, such as that to the admiral Ali Paşa in 1617 allotting a sig-
nificant number of ships “necessary to protect and guard the Well-Protected 
Domains, and for the security and welfare of the ships of merchants and visi-
tors” from pirate attacks around the coasts of Morea.30 By 1718, muḥāfaẓa was 
already a longstanding part of Ottoman maritime vocabulary.
The eighteenth century is different for three reasons in assessing muḥāfaẓa 
at sea. First, we have a greater amount of surviving documentation that gives a 
deeper insight into maritime practices than is possible with the material from 
earlier centuries. Second, this period saw European wars brought to Ottoman 
27   E.g., BOA, Ali Emiri Tasnifi, III Ahmet (Ali Emiri Series, Ahmed III, AE.SAMD.III.) 87/8655 
(end of Zilhicce 1115/ beginning of May 1704).
28   Ivetic, “Peace of Passarowitz,” 66-68. On Morea as an island, see: Kahraman Şakul, 
“The Ottoman Peloponnese before the Greek Revolution: ‘A republic of ayan, hakim, 
and koçabaşı’ in ‘the sea of humans and valley of castles’,” in a forthcoming edition of 
Princeton Papers on Ottoman insularity edited by Antonis Hadjikyriacou.
29   BO, İbnülemin Tasnifi, Bahriye (İbülemin Series, Naval, İE.BH.) 11/1026 (1 Şevval 1106/ 
15 May 1695); İE.BH.11/981, 11/986, 11/998 (10 Receb 1113/ 11 December 1701); İE.BH.12/1113, 
12/1115, 12/1116 (beginning of Ramazan 1118/ beginning of December 1706); C.BH.15/722 
(12 Şevval 1121 / 14 December 1709). On the seventeenth-century navy in general, see İdris 
Bostan, Osmanlı Bahriye Teşkilatı: XVII. Yuzyılda Tersâne-i Âmire (Ankara, 1998).
30   BOA, Mühimme Defterleri (Registers of Orders, MD), III. nos.18, 761; BOA, MD.LXXXII, 
no.233. The Mühimme Registers are full of examples of commands relating to naval pro-
tection missions in this earlier period, and my thanks go to Emrah Safa Gürkan for his 
advice on locating examples in these sources.
waters through large numbers of privateers, creating new dangers for Ottoman 
shipping due to an ever-increasing quantity of Ottoman goods freighted on 
European ships. Third, the fixing of borders in 1699 and 1718 meant that mari-
time territoriality was a definable and implementable concept, particularly 
given that treaties like Passarowitz made explicit mention of the sea as a legal 
space.
In the fifteenth article of the Venetian text of that treaty, it specifically set 
forth that “the subjects of both powers may trade on land and at sea in per-
petual peace, security, and free from all impediment.”31 The importance of 
the phrase “on land and at sea”—tam terra quam mari—for the freedom 
of commerce in particular is a nod to the basic freedoms granted in almost 
all of the Capitulations granted by the Ottoman Empire. However, that sea, 
an undefined deryā or mare, was different from a territorial sea. Nor were 
territorial waters explained in the treaty, so that border lines went “straight 
towards the sea” (recta versus mare), but not into it.32 The fact that the 
“Archipelago”—the Ionian Islands—was mentioned as being part of the fixed 
borders (parte finibus) may indicate some sense of the sea as a  boundary.33 
However, in the treaty with the Habsburgs at Passarowitz, a clear sense of 
maritime territoriality is given in the thirteenth article, which relates to the 
coastal stronghold of Ülgün (also known at the time as Dulcigno, today’s 
Ulcinj in Albania), notorious as a center of piracy in the Adriatic into the 
eighteenth century.34
Ottoman Turkish text:
[…] Likewise, the inhabitants of the citadel of Ülgün situated on the sea-
coast, having been going out corsairing, their frigates and other pirate 
ships shall be confiscated in order that they shall not harm merchant 
ships, they shall be prohibited completely from attacking merchant ships, 
and henceforth it is decreed that they may not construct [ships]. 
Consequently, any of them who act or behave contrary to the imperial 
command and against the [established] peace and harmony by daring 
to bring havoc upon merchant ships through their plundering and loot-
ing shall restore any of the goods and wares that they hold and possess, 
31   Treaties between Turkey and Foreign Powers (London, 1855), 743.
32   Ibid., 739.
33   Ibid., 739-740.
34   The so-called “Dulcigno Pirates” are still relatively understudied, particularly for the eigh-
teenth century. On piracy in the Adriatic after the Ottoman conquest of Albania, see: İdris 
Bostan, Adriyatik’te Korsanlık: Osmanlılar, Uskoklar, Venedikler, 1575-1620 (Istanbul, 2009).
and if they have caused any damage or losses they themselves are to 
compensate for them [şöyle ki içlerinden fermān-ı hümāyūna muḫālif ve 
ṣulḥ ve ṣalāḥa muġāyir vażʿ ve hareket ve tüccār sefīnelerine iṣāl-ı ḫasārete 
cesāret eydenleriñ nehb ve ġāret eyledikleri emvāl ve eşyā her ne ise gīr 
ve ṣāḥiblerine istirdād ve vāḳaʿ olan żarar ve ziyān kendülerden tażmīn]. 
Moreover, if they enslave any person, they are to free them from slav-
ery. In addition, if a punishment is to be drawn up for their crime arising 
from the requirements of the [Islamic] law in order to make an example 
of this sort of banditry to others, it shall arise from firm justice. In order 
to secure and protect commercial traffic from disturbance and con-
flict, the two sides are to fix and appoint agents for the ease of engaging 
in any sort of dialogue, and if a judgment is given, it is to be included in 
and appended to the treaty so that it will be observed by and enforced 
upon all.35 
Latin text:
[…] Likewise, the inhabitants of the stronghold of Ülgün situated on the 
seacoast are to be restrained from engaging in piracy henceforth, and 
shall be forbidden from harassing or harming merchant ships, as well 
as from building themselves piratical barques, frigates, and other ships 
to replace those taken from them. Consequently, such plunderers that 
should presume to harm merchant ships contrary to the imperial capitu-
lations shall restore all the goods and wares that they have plundered, 
provide compensation for damages and losses [ita quidem, ut in tales 
prædones, qui contra imperiales pacis capitulationes mercatorum navibus 
damna invehere, easque aggredi ausi fuerint, restitutis omnibus in prædam 
ablatis rebus et bonis, resarcitisque damnis et iacturis], and free prison-
ers that they have taken, and, justice being sought in order to made an 
example to others, they are to be punished according to the laws. In order 
that all commerce be free from ill-intent, whatever those appointed by 
the [treaty] commissioners from both sides to handle [any dispute] shall 
conclude and determine will be confirmed, and inserted in and appended 
to the capitulations.36 
35   BOA, Düvel-i Ecnebiye Defterleri, Nemçelü Ahidname Defteri (Registers of Foreign States, 
Austrian Treaties, A.DVNS.DVE.d.57/1), fol. 59.
36   Treaties between Turkey and Foreign Powers, 74.
Moreover, there are important similarities between the legal thinking behind 
these clauses of the treaties drawn up in 1718 and the maritime regulations 
governing European privateers first instituted in 1696 by the Ottoman admi-
ral Mezamora Hüseyin, noted in this account by the British consul in Izmir, 
William Raye:
[…] After reciting former difference betwixt the English, French, and 
Dutch nations, he declares that from Andro[s] and Stanchoi [Kos] hither 
[i.e. to Foça near Izmir] no acts of hostility should be committed; and 
that if any ship acted contrary thereto and took any other within those 
limits, he did engage to the party suffering that restitution should be 
entirely made him for all damages sustained by the captor.37
The common features here are that there were set spaces within which mari-
time violence was prohibited—the entire Adriatic for the Ülgün pirates and 
most of the Aegean for the European privateers—and that those who com-
mitted any depredations were themselves obliged to restore the goods they 
had taken and/or to pay full compensation for any losses. This goes far beyond 
notions of maritime authority expressed in earlier treaties.
From the Ottoman response to British and French privateers in the 1690s 
and 1700s, it seems clear that borders and territoriality were becoming part 
of Ottoman maritime discourse, and this immediately changes what it meant 
to patrol in a certain liquid space. In addition to the three key developments 
of more sources, new forms of threat, and a sense of legal maritime spaces, 
were two further interlinked factors that shaped the development of mari-
time muḥāfaẓa in the eighteenth century: the increased risk of disruption to 
mercantile shipping, particularly given the growing role of European freight-
ers in Ottoman trade and the growing level of international trade around 
the Ottoman realms in general; and numerous famines at various times 
across the eastern Mediterranean, a major factor, for instance, in the dispatch 
of ships to protect merchants sailing on a key shipping route between Syria 
and Egypt from pirate attacks in the open waters beyond the Egyptian and 
Palestinian coasts in 1710.38 
The period after Passarowitz therefore represents a convergence of all of 
these factors, and this helps to explain why we begin to see concerted efforts 
to invest in and consolidate a regular naval presence in the Mediterranean 
37   School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), Special Collections, Paget Papers (SC.PP) 
5/27(iii), William Raye to Lord Paget, 3 July 1696.
38   BOA/C.BH.91/4391 (10 Rebiülevvel 1122 / 9 May 1710).
from this point, with extraordinary legal measures applied in times of height-
ened threat. In September 1719, a naval commander, a certain Mehmed 
Ḳapudan, was “appointed for the duty of protection to the Mediterranean Sea” 
(Aḳ Deñiz cānibine ḥiẕmet-i muḥāfaẓaya meʾmūr olan), tasked with taking the 
fleet based in Bodrum from the island of Kos to Kalymnos, Leros, Patmos, 
Icaria, across the “gulf of Samos,” and to the island of Chios, a journey of some 
200 kilometers.39 This was not the only muḥāfaẓa operation launched in 
that year, with one Hasan Ḳapudan appointed for that purpose to the island 
of Euboea (Ağrıboz), and both these missions represent a centrally-directed 
defensive deterrent against maritime violence across a broad space of Ottoman 
waters.40 The area of Mehmed Ḳapudan’s patrol is notable in being the space 
within which the maritime regulations against European privateers had been 
enforced through the 1696 and 1703 regulations, where the Venetian fleet had 
sailed prior to the Battle of Imbros in 1717, and through which a significant 
amount of international and domestic freight passed to and from Izmir and 
Istanbul. Between the missions of the naval commanders Mehmed in the east-
ern Aegean and Hasan in the west, the Ottoman fleet was marking out a part 
of the Mediterranean that could be claimed as Ottoman. This delineation of 
the Mediterranean as an abstract unitary space—Aḳ Deñiz cānibine, literally 
to the area, direction, or side of the Mediterranean—punctuated by stops in 
islands or ports, supports Marinos Sariyannis’s assertion in his wonderful article 
on a seventeenth- century Ottoman pirate novel, that “one could even say there 
is no Mediterranean Sea in the narrative; there are only itineraries.”41 However, 
in many of the documents regarding naval protection in the eighteenth cen-
tury, the sole description of their patrol territory was the Mediterranean 
cānib. Itineraries were for the benefit of the captains; the Ottoman state 
tended to think about and therefore describe a more general Mediterranean 
territorial space.
Whilst protecting against pirates and corsairs, the Ottoman fleet did not 
itself discard corsairing as a more proactive tactic against maritime violence.42 
In 1722, a report reached Istanbul from the province of Sayda detailing unrest 
off the Palestinian and Syrian coasts, particularly around the port of Haifa, 
which had become a refuge for “infidel pirates to take on water and find safety 
39   BOA/İE.BH.16/1442 (14 Zilkade 1131 / 28 September 1719).
40   BOA/İE.BH.18/1627 (16 Şevval 1131 / 1 September 1719).
41   Marinos Sariyannis, “Images of the Mediterranean in an Ottoman Pirate Novel from the 
Late Seventeenth Century,” Osmanlı Araştırmaları / The Journal of Ottoman Studies 39 
(2012): 189-204 at 201.
42   Brummett, Ottoman Seapower, 96-99.
from danger.”43 Describing the Haifa pirates as infidel (kefere) is an example 
of the most common adjective to describe the perpetrators of maritime vio-
lence, and could simply be a means of emphasizing their criminality, but 
taking the adjective to simply mean non-Muslim, it could be referring to any 
of the Christian corsairs.44 In this case, however, given that Maltese pirates 
frequently raided Haifa in this period, it is not inconceivable that they could 
be the culprits here.45 It was resolved to strengthen the port’s fortifications, 
increase the garrison, and dispatch imperial ships so that “the shores of Arabia 
do not remain in the hands of infidel pirates.”46 Although the mission to Haifa 
was described in this particular command as one of muḥāfaẓa, another from 
the same year describes the galleon Ḳūş Bāġçeli (The Bird Garden) as being 
“sent to the Mediterranean in order to engage in corsairing (ḳorṣanlıḳ).”47 Ḳūş 
Bāġçeli was to take a number of soldiers to the port of Tripoli (in Syria), and 
then “be appointed to cruise in the ports of Tripoli and Sidon and in their envi-
rons, in order to guard and protect them from infidel pirates.”48 Thus, a gal-
leon of the Ottoman imperial fleet was sent on a corsairing mission to protect 
Ottoman waters and ports in the Levant from pirates and corsairs; it could be 
said that corsairing was the active form of defensive muḥāfaẓa.49
43   BOA/C.BH.158/7510 (2 Zilhicce 1134 / 13 September 1722). See: Thomas Philipp, Acre: The 
Rise and Fall of a Palestinian City (New York, 2001), 97; Mahmoud Yazbak, Haifa in the Late 
Ottoman Period, 1864-1914: A Muslim Town in Transition (Leiden, 1998), 9-13; Amnon Cohen, 
“Teʿudot ʿOthmaniot ʿal benyinah shel Ḥeyfah be-meʾah ha-18,” ʾErets-Yiśra ʾel: Meḥḳarim 
be-Yediyʿat ha-ʿErets ṿe ʿAtiḳotiyah (1971), 152-159.
44   For a recent reassessment of Christian pirates and corsairs in the Mediterranean, see: 
Molly Greene, Catholic Pirates and Greek Merchants: A Maritime History of the Early 
Modern Mediterranean (Princeton, 2010), especially 78-137.
45   On the Maltese corsairs in general, see: Michel Fontenay, « Corsaires de la foi ou rent-
iers du sol? Les Chevaliers de Malte dans le corso méditerranée au XVIIe siècle, » Revue 
d’histoire moderne et contemporaine 35 (1988): 361-384. For the eighteenth century: Michel 
Fontenay, “Les derniers feux du ‘corso’ chrétien à Malte (1678-1798)” in Méditerranée, 
mer ouverte: Actes du colloque de Marseille, 21-23 septembre 1995, ed. Christane Villain-
Gandossi, Louis Durteste and Salvino Busuttil (Aix-en-Provence, 1997), vol. 1: 209-226; 
Robert Cavaliero, “The decline of the Maltese corso in the eighteenth century: A study in 
maritime history,” Melita Historica 2 (1959): 224-238.
46   BOA/C.BH.158/7510.
47   BOA/C.BH.122/5928 (26 Cemaziülevvel 1134 / 14 March 1722). In terms of currency, there 
were 3 aḳçes in a para, and 40 paras in the ġurūş, making 120 aḳçes in the ġurūş. Although 
many calculations were still made in aḳçes, the main unit of account was the ġurūş.
48   Ibid.
49   For a similar case, see: BOA/C.BH.228/10553 (1143 / second half of 1731).
As the example of Haifa shows, as well as being detrimental to seaborne 
trade, maritime violence greatly affected Ottoman coastal settlements, often 
leading those communities to seek assistance from the state. In 1729, a petition 
was dispatched by Mehmed Emin, a senior qadi on Samos, writing that “all of 
the subjects of the island of Samos had come to the shariʿa court to make a 
declaration.”50 He complained that the chief monk serving as the island’s des-
pot (despoṭdar) had colluded with “evil men and bandits together with pirate 
ships,” and that “he has given [the bandits and pirates] grain from our island 
[and] recently he has taken figs and grapes from a number of Muslim ships, 
laden them on a caïque, and sent it to Istanbul.”51 Violence such as this pro-
vided a challenge to imperial authority in the provinces, especially when local 
notables became involved. At the same time, such incidents provided the state 
with the opportunity to enforce its presence on its coasts and islands, often, as 
in this case, at the request of their own subjects. 
The increasing call from the provinces for protection and the general peace 
on the western frontiers after 1718 meant that by the later 1730s the Ottoman 
fleet was expanding the scale of its patrols in the Mediterranean. The war with 
Russia and the Habsburgs between 1735 and 1739 seems to have increased pro-
tection missions in the face of potential foreign threats, so that a fleet of seven 
ships was prepared for duty in the Mediterranean in 1736.52 Such a high level 
of deployment came with significant expenditure. Documents for the year 1150 
(1737/8) give an insight into the amount of paperwork and expense involved 
in organizing the fleet, of which the following are indicative examples. In 
November 1737, approval was given for the provisioning of the caravels Ġazāle 
(The Hind) and Şehbāz-ı Baḥrī (The Royal Falcon of the Sea) and their com-
bined crew of 650 levends (independent mercenary soldiers) and 30 slaves, 
comprising 300 kiles of rice, 650 kiles of lentils, 2,990 oḳḳas of olive oil, 60 kiles 
of wheat, and 1,422 ḳanṭars of hardtack.53 This required the services of a num-
ber of different departments of state, so that the rice, lentils, and wheat were 
to be procured by the chief of the imperial kitchens (maṭbaḫ-ı ʿāmire emīni), 
and the olive oil by the head customs official (gümrūk emīni). Similarly, in the 
50   BOA, Cevdet Tasnifi, Zabtiye (Cevdet Series, Security, C.ZB.) 5/201 (15 Rebiülahir 1142 / 
7 November 1729).
51   Ibid.
52   BOA/C.BH.121/5883 (first half of 1149 / first half of 1736).
53   BOA/C.BH.120/5827 (29 Receb 1150 / 22 September 1737). In Istanbul terms, the ḳanṭar 
weighed around 56.44 kg, whilst the kile was equivalent to about 25.66 kg, the subunit of 
which was the oḳḳa of around 1.28 kg. On the use of levends, see: Aksan, Ottoman Wars, 
56-57.
autumn of 1738, seven ships with crews totalling 1,830 levends and 68 slaves 
were supplied with 3,660 kiles of brown rice, 1,830 kiles of lentils, 136 kiles of 
wheat, 8,694 oḳḳas of olive oil, and 4,012 ḳanṭars of hardtack, with the pro-
visions coming from the imperial storehouse (kilār-ı ʿāmire) and dockyards 
(tersāne-ı ʿāmire), the customs office, and a number of private merchants. And 
it was not just the center bearing the burden. A document concerning the dis-
patch of two ships in 1732 to protect the coast around Antalya from pirates 
explained that 240,000 aḳçes (2,000 ġurūş) would be required from revenue of 
the Antalya customs tax-farm for the costs of the mission.54 In other words, the 
costs of maintaining, equipping, and manning the ships on muḥāfaẓa missions 
was to be paid, in certain cases, not from the coffers of central government in 
Istanbul, but from the revenue of tax-farms in the areas to be protected (known 
as the ocaḳlıḳ system). 
From these documents, representative of a significant number of records 
detailing expenditure on the Ottoman navy in this period, we can get a sense 
of the manpower, provisions, cost, and organizational effort required to send 
these ships to the Mediterranean. The fact that a number of ships with crews of 
between three and four hundred levends were active in those waters on  rotation 
demonstrates the Ottoman government’s commitment to naval protection in 
terms of deployment and expenditure. By the later 1730s, the Ottoman fleet 
was developing protective corsairing forays into regular preventative or deter-
rent muḥāfaẓa missions, shifting from mobilization due to the conflict with 
Russia and the Habsburgs into a concerted effort to simultaneously assert a 
defensive presence in Ottoman waters and provide Ottoman subjects with 
protection from ḳorsans of all descriptions, often at the request of provincial 
subjects who, through ocaḳlıḳ, also began to take on some of the financial bur-
den. However, it would be the tumult of the 1740s and 1750s that would really 
solidify the role of muḥāfaẓa missions in response to ongoing corsair attacks 
and a growing threat of European privateers. 
 Muḥāfaẓa in Peace, Famine, and International Conflict, 1740-1763
Although the Ottoman Empire was at peace with its European neighbors in 
the years between the Treaty of Belgrade in 1739 and the outbreak of war with 
Russia in 1768, the eastern Mediterranean saw a sustained period of violence 
against Ottoman shipping and subjects, in part at the hands of Maltese cor-
sairs and Morean pirates, but also due to inter-European conflicts  bringing 
54   BOA/C.BH.143/6895 (21 Rebiülahir 1145 / 1 October 1732).
 privateering wars into Ottoman waters. Anti-piracy measures consequently 
took on new legal, spatial, and diplomatic dimensions. A beginning of this 
process can be traced to an imperial command issued in March 1740. A com-
plaint had been made by the Venetian ambassador that a Venetian ship 
going into the open sea (rūy-u deryāya) carrying goods of Ottoman Muslims 
and non- Muslims living in the Mediterranean had been set upon by a pirate 
ship.55 Action was requested to protect trade routes to the Ottoman Empire 
and to Venice, and specifically to defend “persons and their goods from being 
set upon by infidel pirates causing damage and harm.”56 This, of course, harks 
back to the agreements reached at Passarowitz. Consequently, measures were 
taken to alert the judges, governors, commanders, and castellans in Salonica, 
Euobea, Morea, Sidon, Tripoli, Rhodes, Antalya, and Cyprus, and to increase 
coastal garrisons where necessary. 
As with the case of Haifa twenty years earlier, moves to strengthen coastal 
fortifications were soon followed by naval action, so that in October 1740, 
eight galleons were ordered to be sent to the Mediterranean.57 This was fol-
lowed in January 1741 by a command issued to a number of senior naval offi-
cers under the commander responsible for Mediterranean protection, Küçük 
Ahmed Ḳapudan, reporting that “a polacca and a saitee from among the cor-
sair ships of the Maltese infidels concealed themselves in Porto Koufo, near to 
the island of Kassandra (one of the dependents of Salonica), and in the dead 
of night raided the said island,” resulting in a local notable being enslaved 
along with his two servants, their goods looted and pillaged.58 As a result, 
Ottoman warships were to “prepare for the duty of protecting and securing 
the Mediterranean from piratical banditry,” and to “secure the waters of my 
Well-Protected Domains from the ravages of the pirates.”59 Moreover, with an 
increasing number of European states holding Capitulations guaranteeing free 
movement and right to trade, the international dimensions of maritime secu-
rity were addressed by ensuring that “those who come and go to the waters of 
my Well-Protected Domains with their flag and passports shall in every way 
be shielded from attack.”60 With an eye to domestic as well as  international 
55   BOA, Ali Emiri Tasnifi, I. Mahmud (Ali Emiri Series, Mahmud I, AE.SMHD.I.) 25/1477 (end 
of Zilhicce 1152 / end of March 1740).
56   Ibid.
57   BOA/C.BH.233/10805 (12 Receb 1153 / 3 October 1740).
58   BOA/AE.SMHD.I.58/3697 (middle of Şevval 1153 / 3 January 1741). See also: C.BH.225/10471 
(middle of Zilhicce 1153 / beginning of March 1741).
59   BOA/AE.SMHD.I.58/3697.
60   Ibid.
commerce, the fleet was reminded of the importance of “protecting and 
securing the grain-purchasing ships coming to Salonica and its environs.”61 
Guarding the Mediterranean therefore entailed protecting both Ottoman ter-
ritory and Ottoman and müsteʾmin trade. 
The three imperial commands of 1740 and 1741 were issued in a pivotal period 
marked by three main themes. First, the Treaty of Belgrade in 1739 had secured 
a reasonable peace on the Ottomans’ western borders, effectively ending the 
Ottoman-Habsburg conflicts (the brief conflict of 1787-91 excepted), and giving 
a pause in the wars with Russia for almost thirty years, allowing the Ottoman 
fleet to focus on maintaining local order. Second, the Ottoman provinces were 
experiencing hardships due to extreme climatic events, notably the famine 
in the Levant during 1740-5.62 The later eighteenth century saw Anatolia and 
Syria hit by serious food shortages, making the protection of maritime supply 
lines absolutely vital. Third, in the 1740s-1760s the impact of European political 
struggles would make itself dramatically felt in the Ottoman Mediterranean. 
The 1740s saw the arrival of intense European privateering in the eastern 
Mediterranean as the War of the Austrian Succession (1740-8), and, after a brief 
respite, the Seven Years’ War (1756-63) saw the violence return, with the major 
European powers such as France, Britain, Spain, Holland, and others, involved 
in both conflicts that spilled into the Eastern Mediterranean in different alli-
ance combinations. Privateering and continued corsair attacks threatened 
Ottoman supply routes and territorial integrity at a time of high demand for 
food staples, and when stable peace agreements saw the Ottoman state keen 
and able to assert its territorial sovereignty at sea. 
A number of imperial commands and financial documents record the 
mobilization of the fleet for regular anti-piracy patrols from the beginning of 
the 1740s. In the summer of 1740, the vice-admiral’s flagship was tasked with 
“protecting the ships freighting wheat from the port of Volos to the Abode 
of Felicity [Istanbul] from the seizures and attacks of infidel pirates in the 
Mediterranean Sea.”63 The unusually high number of fourteen frigates were 
sent for muḥāfaẓa in 1740-1 and ten in 1741-2.64 Coordination was also made 
with land defenses, with the appointment of Seyid Mehmed Ḳapudan in 
1742 to cruise along the coast of Crete to complement the strengthening of 
61   Ibid.
62   Yaron Ayalon, Natural Disasters in the Ottoman Empire: Plague, Famine, and Other 
Misfortunes (Cambridge, 2015), 18. See also: Sam White, “The Real Little Ice Age,” Journal 
of Interdisciplinary History 44 (2014): 327-352.
63   BOA/C.BH.168/7928 (23 Rebiülahir 1153 / 17 July 1740).
64   BOA/C.BH.86/4131 (28 Şevval 1155 / 26 December 1742).
the  garrisons of the castles of Rethymno and Chania, part of a broad effort 
“to protect the poor people of the realm from the oppressive acts of pirati-
cal banditry.”65 Moreover, corsairing remained an option, with a number 
of galleons recorded as being engaged in that activity around the Aegean 
Islands in 1741.66
The arrival of British and French privateers in Ottoman waters in the late 
1740s proved to be a significant moment that defined the relationship between 
the Ottoman state and the Mediterranean Sea in times of emergency. This was 
largely driven by the complaints and pleas for assistance from Ottoman officials 
and merchants from around the Mediterranean. For instance, a petition was 
submitted to the central government by the qadi of Tuzla on Cyprus near the 
war’s end in May 1748, reporting that the British consul, George Wakeman, had 
gone to the shariʿa court to give a formal representation (taḳrīr).67 Wakeman 
complained that a French privateer had taken a Dutch ship under the cannons 
of the port, an action described by Wakeman (via the qadi) as “contrary to the 
imperial capitulations and contrary to the exalted command.”68 This petition 
formed part of the legal battle that accompanied the violence at sea, with the 
“exalted command” referring to the new maritime regulations.
The basis of the legal defense against privateers from friendly nations such 
as the British and French was a dramatic extension of the maritime regulations 
first instituted against European privateers in 1696 and again in 1703, which 
forbade armed European ships from committing acts of violence anywhere in 
the Aegean Sea, even beyond the coastal waters. Unlike other initiatives used 
to govern Ottoman maritime space, such as the permissions for sailing in cer-
tain waters such as the Dardanelles (the iẕn-i sefīne), the commercial agree-
ments that later regulated contentious spaces such as the Black Sea, or indeed 
the prohibition on Adriatic piracy set down at Passarowitz, were temporary 
and extraordinary measures used at key moments in the eighteenth century 
to halt European privateering violence.69 In the 1740s, in response to a  number 
65   BOA/C.BH.213/9933 (19 Cemaziülahir 1155 / 20 August 1742).
66   BOA/C.BH.87/4160 (15 Şevval 1154 / 24 December 1741).
67   BOA/AE.SMHD.I.34/1981 (18 Cemaziülevvel 1161 / 13 May 1748). On taḳrīrs: Michael Talbot, 
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69   On the naval permissions, see: Hamiyet Sezer, “Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nda Seyahat 
İzinleri, 18-19 yüzyıl,” Ankara Üniversitesi Dil ve Tarih-Coğrafya Fakültesi Tarih Bölümü Tarih 
Araştırmaları Dergisi 21 (2003), 105-124; Talbot, “Petitions of the Supplicant Ambassador,” 
171-177. On later developments in the Black Sea, particularly relating to trade see: İdris 
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of attacks against ships carrying Ottoman goods and subjects, and fighting 
occurring a short distance off the Ottoman coast under the guns of coastal 
fortifications and within harbors, the Ottoman government reinstituted and 
extended these regulations. Two crucial commands were issued in March 
and October 1744. The first reported two British privateers cruising in the waters 
around the islands of Kefalonia and Lefkada (Aya Mavro) making attacks on 
French ships around Ottoman ports.70 In response, the Ottoman government 
informed the Mediterranean governors and commanders that such actions 
were contrary to the Capitulations and that attacks were not permitted within 
a number of miles (bir ḳaç mīl) of the Ottoman coast. As the violence con-
tinued, the more forceful October command was issued to Ottoman officials 
and European diplomats, fixing a border (ḥadd) across the sea beyond which 
attacks by armed European ships would no longer be tolerated, to wit between 
Morea and the Gulf of Sirte in Libya.71 This command, an important innova-
tion in Ottoman maritime legal practice, specifically employed the language of 
protection, emphasizing that the new measures were “to protect and guard the 
subjects and merchants of my Sublime State from harm” (Devlet-i ʿAliyem reʿāyā 
ve tüccārını żarar ve ḥasāretden muḥāfaẓa ve ṣiyānet).72 This idea of protec-
tion was of course not novel in sentiment, taking the earlier regulations even 
further, but the legal and political implications of shutting off a huge amount 
of maritime space beyond ordinary territorial waters is indicative of both the 
need to establish a significant buffer zone and an attempt to find a non-violent 
and effective solution to the growing violence of supposedly friendly states.
The British chargé d’affaires, Stanhope Aspinwall, wrote to London full 
of sympathy for the Ottoman position, but skeptical as to the practicalities of 
enforcing such a legal space:
[O]ur privateers in the midst of a sea of sixty-six leagues large could not 
possibly tell whether they were got into the seas of the Porte or no, and in 
Tüccarları, 1780-1846” in İdris Bostan, ed., Beylikten İmparatorluğa Osmanlı Denizciliği 
(Istanbul, 2006), 353-394, especially 366-373 on the later eighteenth century; Kemal 
Beydilli, “Karadeniz Kapalılığı Karşısında Avrupa Küçük Devletleri ve ‘Miri Ticareti’ 
Teşebbüsü,” Belleten 55 (1991), 687-755, particularly the discussions on 689-695.
70   BOA, Cevdet Tasnifi, Hariciye (Cevdet Series, Foreign, C.HR.) 140/6968 (end of Muharrem 
1157 / mid-March 1744).
71   BOA/C.HR.121/6030 (end of Şaban 1157 / beginning of October 1744).
72   Although it is usual for Ottoman commands to contain near-synonymic word-pairs (e.g. 
muḥāfaẓa ve ḥırāset) the choice here of muḥāfaẓa and ṣiyānet is interesting, with the 
former holding defensive connotations and the latter having the sense of being more 
proactive.
bad weather may roam the seas several days without knowing it, as they 
cannot see even the coasts of either side; and there, in case of a capture, 
how could either the captor know it to be taken, or the prize make it 
appear he was taken, out of bounds? So that a line to be drawn across so 
large a sea is the most chimerical thing that was ever imagined.73
Despite reasonable objections to the new regulations, Aspinwall had not con-
sidered the cooperation of provincial authorities and merchants. In September 
1745, in direct contravention of the new regulations, the British ship HMS 
Diamond chased a French vessel near the port of Foça, near Izmir. On see-
ing this, the governor of the castle fired three warning shots from the castle’s 
cannon and detained a number of British merchants to ensure the ship’s 
good behavior. Aspinwall considered this a gross insult and protested to the 
Ottoman government.74 However, after an investigation by the commander of 
an Ottoman Aegean fleet that visited Foça, it was confirmed that the Diamond 
had indeed been pursuing a passing a French ship in these restricted waters.75 
Moreover, this violation was recorded at the time and in situ by a declaration 
lodged with the qadi of Foça, signed by fifty-six Muslim notables and mer-
chants of the town.76 This provided incontrovertible proof for the Ottoman 
government that the British had violated the maritime regulations.
Things reached a head with the rampage of a British privateer named 
Fortunatus Wright, captain of The Fame. Among the archival records of the 
British embassy in Istanbul are documents of aggrieved Ottoman merchants, 
including the losses of one group attacked on board a French ship that they 
were freighting to Crete. First, they lodged inventories of their goods with the 
customs official via the qadi court in Candia, which were subsequently trans-
lated and registered in the embassy’s chancery.77 Then, the merchants arrived 
in person at the British embassy to register their claim against the privateer, 
amounting to the huge sum of 20,420 ġurūş.78 The combined pressure of the 
73   The National Archives, UK (TNA), State Papers (SP) 97/32 Stanhope Aspinwall to the Duke 
of Newcastle (12 May 1744).
74   TNA/SP 97/32 Aspinwall to Newcastle (24 September 1745).
75   TNA/SP 97/32 Aspinwall to Newcastle (9 November 1745).
76   BOA, Düvel-i Ecnebiye 3 (Foreign States, 3 (Britain) A.DVN.DVE.3) 81/6 (19 Ramazan 1158 / 
15 October 1745).
77   TNA/SP 97/32 “Carto d’oglio, sappone, e d’altre mercanzie sopra la nave francese di 
Capitan Blanc nella scala di Candia destinado per Alessandria” (19 Cemaziülevvel 1159 / 
5 June 1746); “Note delle robbe appartenente alli mercanti e passaggieri turchi imbarcatisi 
nella nave di Capitan Blanc, francese […]” (15 Cemaziülevvel 1159 / 5 June 1746).
78   TNA/SP 97/32 Sealed registration of the merchants’ claims (19 August 1746).
Ottoman merchants, and the insistence of the Ottoman state upon the British 
authorities led the Levant Company, the commercial monopoly that financed 
the British embassy and oversaw British trade in the Ottoman Empire, fearing 
that its merchants’ trade would suffer, to pay compensation in this case as in 
many others, totalling over 100,000 ġurūş for depredations made off the coasts 
of Crete, Cyprus, and Syria between 1744 and 1747.79
The legal aspect of the Ottoman anti-privateering strategy in the 1740s was a 
significant development in the Ottoman approach to müsteʾmin violence off its 
coasts. However, naval patrols continued in earnest around the Mediterranean, 
with a number of ships recorded as undertaking such missions throughout 
the conflict, rising from around five in 1743 to no less than thirteen engaged 
on muḥāfaẓa duty in the Mediterranean in 1748, the great expense of keeping 
them operational mitigated through provincial contributions.80 Yet, despite 
the new maritime regulations, and the increasing presence of Ottoman ships 
on protection duty, little seemed to work to actually stop the attacks of the 
British privateers. 
In the brief period of peace that followed after 1748, the threat from 
Maltese and other corsairs and pirates remained, and so defensive patrolling 
 continued.81 Moreover, we see continued requests from the provinces for pro-
tection from maritime violence. An important example of this is found in a 
case from November 1752, when Panayiotis Yanakis, a ḳocabaşı (non-Muslim 
local notable) in Kalamata, presented a taḳrīr to the Ottoman government 
complaining that the military commander of Morea, Halil Bey, had seized one 
hundred purses of his goods and sold his family and children to “the infidels 
of Mani.”82 The official declarations of the qadi of Tripolis confirmed that ten 
members of Panayotis’s household were seized, together with his goods, by a 
certain villain (şaḳī) called Todoraki, son of Komandro of Mani. A summary of 
the case further noted: 
Every year, a frigate captain is appointed to the coasts of Koroni, Kalamata, 
and Mani on the island of Morea with the taxes of Koroni, in order to pro-
tect it against infidel pirates. Whilst Halil Bey was collecting and passing 
79   TNA/SP 97/33 James Porter to Newcastle (17 May 1747).
80   BOA/C.BH.178/8372 (11 Muharrem 1156 / 8 March 1743); C.BH.83/3997 (13 Şevval 1156 / 
30 November 1743).
81   BOA/C.BH.84/4036 (6 Rebiülevvel 1163 / 13 February 1750); Divan-ı Hümayun, Başmuhasebe 
Kalemı Defterleri (Imperial Council, Chief Accounting Office Registers, D.BŞM.d.) 3080 
(2 Cemaziülevvel 1163 / 9 April 1750); C.BH.25/1171 (2 Safer 1165 / 20 December 1751).
82   BOA/C.ZB.72/3563 (18 Muharrem 1166 / 24 November 1752).
the taxes of Koroni to one of his own men, the Nafplio frigate captain 
Deli Hüseyin, Deli Hüseyin’s frigate, together with the pirate Todoraki 
son of Masko Komandro—who was continually engaging in piracy with 
the Maltese infidels—again levied the said taxes contrary to custom 
and, with the help of the aforementioned Halil Bey, engaged in piracy 
on the said coast. As this is dangerous to the security of the inhabitants 
of the province, the said pirate must by all means be seized wherever he 
be found, and punishment given. In this matter, the attorneys of these 
subjects officially request in their petition that an exalted command be 
sent to the governor of Morea.83
This case seems to be rather exceptional, but the implications are fascinating. 
First, it shows that Ottoman naval captains, as with their European counter-
parts, were still not averse to engaging in illicit corsairing for their own enrich-
ment, alongside other forms of corruption such as double taxation. Second, 
it seems that despite the naval patrols, this part of the Mediterranean was 
considered sufficiently dangerous that tax collection required a warship for 
protection. Finally, the mechanism of complaint is similar to that employed by 
the victims of British privateering, so that Panayiotis went straight to the local 
qadi courts (via a vekīl, an agent, as he was a non-Muslim) and received judg-
ments in his favor. He then travelled to Istanbul to bring his complaint directly 
to the imperial government. The cumulative effect of complaints against such 
threats posed by pirates and corsairs in the Aegean led to an imperial com-
mand boosting muḥāfaẓa missions in the Mediterranean in the spring of 1753, 
and coastal defenses were strengthened.84 
The dangers of European privateering returned with the outbreak of the 
Seven Years’ War, which added to this undercurrent of local violence, with 
the first attack of a British ship against four French vessels containing the 
goods of Ottoman merchants recorded in the harbor of Milos (Değirmenlik) 
in November 1755.85 After 1756, violence began to increase, leading the British 
government to issue an order preventing British ships from seizing Ottoman 
subjects or ships, taking any French ships out of Ottoman harbors, or seizing 
any French ships carrying Ottoman goods.86 Consequently, more care was 
taken than in the previous conflict, but numerous British privateers  continued 
83   Ibid.
84   BOA/C.BH.271/12511 (18 Cemaziülevvel 1166 / 24 March 1753); Cevdet Tasnifi, Maliye 
(Cevdet Series, Financial, C.ML.) 51/2372 (7 Rebiülahir 1167 / 31 January 1754).
85   BOA/C.HR.68/3384 (16 Safer 1169 / 21 November 1755).
86   TNA/SP 97/39 Copy of an Order of Council, 1 June 1756.
to take prizes around ports and in Ottoman coastal waters. One petition sub-
mitted on behalf of the French ambassador in March 1757 complained of a 
British captain named Wilson cruising in and around the Aegean islands and 
the Gulf of Izmir, taking five French ships and selling them in Ottoman ports, 
whilst another in October saw a British privateer taking French and Ragusan 
ships under the guns of Foça.87 Aware of the risk such violence posed to their 
shipping and subjects, the Ottomans reissued the 1744 maritime regulations in 
April 1758, with the official Italian translation of the Ottoman command pre-
sented to the British ambassador James Porter stating that:
A straight line is to be imagined as the furthest border of the Ottoman 
Empire, running from the Morean peninsula and ending in the Gulf of 
Sirte in the southern end of the western part of Egypt, to the east of which 
the Sublime Porte desires that a regulation be made so that the ships of 
Britain and France will not harm each other in any way.88
The Ottoman state had therefore once again extended its maritime boundar-
ies out into the Mediterranean Sea. On this occasion, the combination of the 
Ottoman maritime regulations backed up by pressure from the British authori-
ties seems to have worked to some degree in restraining the British privateers, 
as there are far fewer recorded incidents of Ottoman merchants being attacked 
in the ways they were in the 1740s. 
However, the experiences of the 1740s had taught the Ottomans that rely-
ing on maritime regulations alone would not make their seas safe during this 
new conflict. This renewed threat by supposedly friendly nations required 
a physical presence to both deter privateer and corsair attacks and to reas-
sure the local population. Fourteen imperial frigates were sent to protect the 
Mediterranean in 1758/9, a level similar to that at the end of the previous conflict, 
and the imperial dockyards and the gunpowder factories in Gallipoli contin-
ued to provide the stores and armaments necessary for these missions, as well 
as certain rations and provisions.89 However, as with earlier missions, the state 
drew on provincial resources to help pay for the  maintenance of such a large 
87   BOA/C.HR.154/7682 (6 Receb 1170 / 26 March 1757); BOA/C.HR.24/1186 (5 Safer 1171 / 
19 October 1757). On Wilson, see: Eldem, “Strangers in their own seas?”, 48-49.
88   TNA/SP 97/40 Translation of a memorial or request of the Ottoman Porte (Italian), 
undated but in Porter’s letters of 28 July 1758.
89   For example: BOA/C.BH.74/3504 (25 Cemaziülahir 1169 / 26 March 1756) for gunpowder; 
C.BH.199/9313 (16 Şevval 1174 / 21 May 1761) for provisions; C.BH.12/570 (11 Şevval 1175 / 
6 May 1762) for lead shot.
 operational fleet, effectively directing provincial tax revenues to provide 
for provincial defense, so that 33,410 ġurūş out of a total expense of 48,767 
ġurūş was taken as ocaḳlıḳ from the Rhodes treasury and the funds of certain 
tax-farms.90 This system, it must be said, did not always work as planned; a 
case reported in April 1769 revealed that funds due to the fleet as ocaḳlıḳ from 
a levy on the income of the Aleppo horse market tax-farm had in fact been 
embezzled by the local military commander.91 
Moreover, the impact of this shared burden was, it seems, not always appre-
ciated by Istanbul. One petition sent to Mustafa III in July 1763 showed that 
certain provincial officials were obliged to take things further and help in the 
construction of ships engaged in muḥāfaẓa. The petition, from ʿAbdullah Reʾis, 
Mehmed Reʾis, and another Mehmed Reʾis, all of Chania, narrates the prob-
lems that apparently arose from this duty:
As a consequence of piratical banditry taking place around our prov-
ince, certain people of the island provided a frigate and a pergende with 
their own finances to protect [the island] from pirates. A few years ago, 
as a result of reports of certain müsteʾmin nations acting irregularly, an 
exalted command was sent forth saying ‘you must construct a frigate and 
a pregende, and go out to sea to protect [the island] against pirates.’ As 
the pirates found an opportunity to commit harm against the servants 
of God around Crete, and as a result of the mercies from the imperial 
household of the World-Holder commanding compassion towards the 
people of Islam, we, your slaves, built our pergendes with our own funds, 
equipping them with what was required at the time. Now that this work 
is completed, it is requested that a resplendent imperial order be com-
manded to the governors of Crete so that certain weapons of war be pro-
vided by the Chania armoury should [this service] be required from this 
region again.92 
Thus, despite all of the effort that was put into asserting central authority by 
patrolling the Mediterranean and reinstituting the maritime regulations in 
order to control the European privateers and other corsairs and pirates, the 
state relied on local naval commanders building and equipping new ships at 
their own expense.
90   BOA/C.BH.199/9315 (17 Rebiülahir 1171 / 29 December 1757).
91   BOA/C.ML.631/25924 (23 Zilhicce 1182 / 30 April 1769).
92   BOA/C.BH.104/5011 (2 Muharrem 1177 / 13 July 1763).
The need to rely on the provinces to contribute to the fleet can be explained 
by the greatly increased level of naval operations during the Seven Years’ War. 
Yet this exposes an underlying frailty of the Ottoman naval response due to the 
scale of operations and the resources required to support them. This is particu-
larly significant when we consider the official rationale behind such missions 
in the following imperial command issued in September 1758: 
For protection and security from the schemes and violence of the ban-
ditry of pirates against the merchants, müsteʾmin nations, and especially 
against the galleons and three-mast ships coming and going to Egypt in 
the waters of my Well-Protected Domains in the Mediterranean, for the 
protection and security of the servants of God residing in the islands 
and on the coasts from injustice and attack, and for the needs and 
requirements of their security and ease in the procurement of goods, 
the galleons of the imperial fleet and warships of the naval command-
ers are to go into the Mediterranean in the summer season for the swift 
accomplishment of these goals. In communicating to you, vizier, of the 
need to patrol around the islands and other waters of my Sublime State 
due to the reports sent forth by Muslim judges of the seizures and dam-
ages of the groups of brigands [committing] piratical banditry, this 
blessed year the galleons and warships of the imperial fleet are to be 
organized and equipped again in accordance with previous practice to 
be assigned and appointed to the protection of the Mediterranean Sea.93
The idea of muḥāfaẓa was not simply rhetorical. The Ottoman state was 
intent on keeping its waters open for the commerce of Ottoman subjects and 
 foreigners, and on protecting Ottoman subjects (ʿibādullah, lit. servants of God) 
from all maritime violence. The emphasis on maintaining the routes between 
Egypt and the wider Ottoman realms is linked to the protection of movement 
in the open sea, and to the maintenance of the all-important grain shipments. 
With famine once again prevalent in Palestine and Syria, it was essential for the 
state to ensure the movement of provisions.94 For instance, in 1755 a command 
made out of concern for the welfare (refāh) of Muslim subjects forbade both 
93   BOA/C.BH.254/11749 (1 Muharrem 1172 / 5 September 1758). For a discussion of ocaḳlıḳ, see: 
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ḥarbī (enemy) and müsteʾmin European merchants from purchasing grain.95 
The command for the Cretan naval commanders to build their own ships was 
also phrased in terms of protecting the vulnerable Muslim subjects of that 
island. Yet, there is a disconnect between the rhetoric of imperial protection 
illustrated by the dispatch of fourteen galleons to protect Ottoman waters and 
subjects and a command that ordered local notables to build their own ships 
for their own protection. Clearly, the Ottoman fleet, however large, could not 
be everywhere all the time, and thus some degree of localization of defense 
was required. Such logistical issues did not, however, hinder the wider effort. 
Despite all these measures, the Ottoman Mediterranean, as with the 
Mediterranean in general, continued to suffer from violence during the Seven 
Years’ War. Sometimes there were successes, such as the pirate ship captured 
in 1758, with four enslaved Ottoman Greeks liberated and 27 “infidel pirates” 
enslaved.96 On the whole, however, coastal defenses were still under pressure, 
with pirate attacks around Nafplio leading the governor of Morea to petition 
for measures to improve the security of the castle there, and on Rhodes it was 
deemed necessary to increase the number of shore-watchmen.97 Moreover, 
as late as the summer of 1761, the Ottoman state was receiving complaints 
from the French ambassador that British privateers were attacking their 
ships around Bodrum and Egypt.98 Nonetheless, the level of European vio-
lence against Ottoman subjects and shipping was at a lower level than had 
been the case during the conflict of the 1740s, and far fewer complaints were 
made against British privateers by Ottoman merchants. In the face of con-
tinued corsair and pirate attacks in the Morea and Aegean islands, as well 
as the threat of European privateers, the Ottoman policy of muḥāfaẓa aim-
ing to protect trade, secure the grain routes, and defend the littoral popula-
tion by enlarging the fleet, reinstituting the maritime regulations, and sharing 
the burden of expense with the provinces had had some effect. However, 
even these combined defensive measures could not stop attacks from 
occurring altogether. 
95   BOA, Cevdet Tasnifi, İktisat (Cevdet Series, Economic, C.İKTS.) 34/1653 (15 Zilhicce 1168 / 
22 September 1755).
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Violence in the Mediterranean before the Ottoman-Russian War, 
1764-1770
Muḥāfaẓa missions continued in the aftermath of the Seven Years’ War, initially 
on a smaller scale, as the baseline threat of corsairs and pirates remained.99 
In October 1765 a complaint was received from Morea of attacks taking place 
on the coast near Basova (Passava), where pirate ships had been seizing and 
enslaving Muslims. This petition, initiated by the pleas for help of the inhab-
itants and qadi of the Mistra district, led to the garrison at Basova being 
strengthened with additional troops for the area’s protection and security (ḥıfẓ 
ve ḥırāset).100 A few years later, a command was issued describing attacks on 
merchant shipping off the coasts of Cyprus and Syria, and in the seas around 
Damietta, ordering the admiral take action by dispatching an imperial galleon 
and one or two frigates “for the protection and security of the waters of my 
Sublime State.”101 In this case, the culprits were identified as two Spanish frig-
ates and a patrol ship, evidence of the low-level conflict between Spain and the 
Ottomans prior to the granting of Capitulations to the Spanish in 1782.102 
The identity of many of the non-müsteʾmin corsairs being chased around the 
Mediterranean has remained largely absent from the documents examined, 
except for the usual description of “infidel” (kefere). One document from 1767 
opens up details of the captures made by a group of ships sent to guard the 
Mediterranean.103 It is a list of slaves seized and captured from four different 
ḳorṣan ships: first, thirty sailors taken by pergende captain el-Hac Caʿfer Bey 
from a galleon in the Mediterranean, made up of twenty-three Maltese, two 
French, two Neapolitans, a Venetian, a Spaniard, and one unknown; second, 
a Venetian and an Austrian taken from a ship in the Aegean islands by frigate 
captain İbrahim Bey; third, a crew comprising three Neapolitans, two Maltese, 
and two from Spetses (Suluca); and fourth, six ḳorsans from Kalamata taken 
from a scampavia by frigate captain ʿAli. The first ship, having a majority crew 
of Maltese, alongside a smattering of other Europeans, can reasonably be 
labelled a Maltese corsair. The identity of the second is unclear, as is that of the 
99   BOA/C.BH.242/11218 (17 Receb 1177 / 21 January 1764); C.BH.194/9121 (20 Şevval 1178 / 11 April 
1765).
100   BOA/C.ZB.40/1999 (2 Cemaziülevvel 1179 / 17 October 1765).
101   BOA/C.BH.183/8582 (end of Zilhicce 1180 / 28 May 1767).
102   On the Ottoman-Spanish conflict: Eloy Martin Corrales, “Greek-Ottoman Captains in 
the Service of Spanish Commerce in the Late Eighteenth Century” in Trade and Cultural 
Exchange, 203-222.
103   BOA/C.BH.8/367 (25 Cemaziülahir 1181 / 17 November 1767).
third, although it is notable that aside from the two captives from the Ottoman 
island of Spetses they were all müsteʾmin. The fourth ship was undoubtedly 
a Maniot pirate, with all the captives being from the port of Kalamata, and, 
according to another record, the capture being made off the coast of Mani.104 
The Ottoman state therefore faced continued threats from pirates and cor-
sairs of Maltese, Spanish, müsteʾmin, and Ottoman origin in the mid-1760s. It 
is in this context that the imperial command of September 1758 was reissued 
in 1766 with the aim of ensuring the free movement of merchants and the 
protection of Ottoman ports and coastal settlements from attack.105 This was 
confirmation of the seriousness of the situation, further emphasized by the 
fact that nine galleons holding almost 3,000 levends were sent annually on 
muḥāfaẓa missions on rotation in the winter and summer seasons, requiring 
significant provisioning and financing.106 
On the eve of the outbreak of war with Russia in 1768, a significant force 
of eight imperial galleons came to Istanbul to be re-equipped by the imperial 
arsenal for their next muḥāfaẓa mission, having already served one tour in the 
Mediterranean.107 Three further ships were still out on patrol, making a total 
of eleven galleons; this does not support the notion that the Ottoman fleet 
had backed away from the Mediterranean in this period. With the impending 
approach of the Russian fleet following the formal outbreak of war in October, 
such muḥāfaẓa missions must have taken on a different sense of purpose. The 
Ottoman fleet that would face up to the Russians—who had received signifi-
cant logistical assistance from the British en route to the Mediterranean from 
the Baltic—was a battle-ready force with decades of experience pursuing vari-
ous sorts of enemies in the defense of Ottoman waters. At the same time, hav-
ing been employed largely in anti-piracy missions, it had been some decades 
since the Ottoman navy in the Mediterranean had engaged in naval warfare 
against the fleet of another state. 
The first year or so of the war saw no direct confrontation, and the busi-
ness of guarding the Mediterranean continued. Huge resources were 
placed into muḥāfaẓa going into 1769, with no less than seventeen  imperial 
104   BOA/C.BH.273/12591 (2 Zilhicce 1181 / 19 April 1768). See: Gelina Harlaftis, A History of 
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105   BOA/C.BH.13/627 (15 Şevval 1179 / 26 March 1766).
106   BOA/C.BH.15/718 (18 Ramazan 1179 / 28 February 1766). See also: C.BH.13/650 (7 Zilhicce 
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107   BOA/C.BH.180/8453 (7 Zilkade 1181 / 26 March 1768).
frigates assigned for that task, with 29,716 ġurūş of their salaries paid as 
ocaḳlıḳ from the Rhodes treasury and tax-farms, the remaining 27,083 ġurūş 
coming from the imperial treasury.108 In November 1769, the galleon of 
Kassabcı el-Hac ʿAli and the pergende of Sakızlı Hüsseyin were appointed for 
muḥāfaẓa in spring and, being provided with the usual rations of brown rice, 
lentils, olive oil, and hard-tack from the imperial stores, went out with the gal-
leon Ġazāl-ı Baḥrī (The Gazelle of the Sea) to patrol around Rhodes to gather 
intelligence on and defend against pirates there.109 Elsewhere, the imperial 
frigates appointed to protect Morea seized a pirate scampavia and enslaved 
the twenty-four crewmembers in March 1770.110 
However, in the summer of 1770, the Russians arrived in the Mediterranean 
in strength. At the Battle of Çeşme, fought between July 5 and 7, the Ottoman 
fleet was destroyed in a raging fire sparked during combat. Despite this catas-
trophe, Ottoman naval efforts to protect the Mediterranean did not collapse. 
Just a few weeks after the battle, on July 24, 1770, commands were issued for 
the provisioning of seven merchant ships with a combined total of 11.5 ḳanṭars 
of lead shot and 130 ḳanṭars of black powder to perform muḥāfaẓa duties in 
the Mediterranean.111 This step of resorting to privateering ships to provide 
the protection for Ottoman coasts and islands demonstrates the losses that the 
navy faced in the immediate aftermath of Çeşme but also that the Ottomans 
were capable of organizing this under extreme pressure. By the next spring, 
muḥāfaẓa measures seem to have begun to return to normal, with the dispatch 
of two imperial galleons to the Mediterranean in March 1771, as well as serious 
efforts undertaken to strengthen the garrisons and fortifications on vulnerable 
islands such as Patmos.112 We still find the ranks of the Ottoman navy being 
bolstered by merchant ships acting as privateers, with seven accompanying the 
Naṣr-ı Baḥrī into the Mediterranean in the spring of 1771.113 However, despite 
the damage done to the Mediterranean fleet at Çeşme, efforts still continued 
to protect Ottoman subjects from the ongoing threat of corsairs and pirates. 
Viewed from this perspective, the disaster in 1770 was far less drastic on the 
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ground that it was in the outpouring of reflection it engendered in its wake 
through the pens of Ottoman elites.114 
We might, however, see Çeşme, as the symbolic start of a new sort of 
Northern Invasion, with a gradual shift towards territorial encroachment on 
Ottoman lands and seas, first by the Russians, then by the French, and later the 
British. From this perspective, the list of Ottoman naval defeats noted at the 
 beginning of this article—Ceşme, Gerontas, Navarino, Sinop—are less indica-
tors of decline than of a new period of northern domination through violence 
that began to be displayed during the European privateering wars of the later 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Although there are reports of Ottoman 
ships being seized by Maltese pirates into the 1780s, their threat was greatly 
diminished and would soon be altogether removed.115 After 1770, the dispatch 
of Ottoman troops to Mani in response to a revolt catalyzed by the Russian 
invasion saw a significant attempt to reduce piracy from the Morea, and, as 
the research of Gelina Harlaftis and Sophia Laiou has shown, from that period 
Greek and other Ottoman shipping began to play an increasingly important 
part in the Mediterranean economy, in part due to the seemingly interminable 
inter-European conflicts brought first by the war in North America and then 
by the French Revolution.116 Zooming back from this macro vision of events, 
however, to Naṣr-ı Baḥrī setting off from Istanbul in 1771 with cannonballs and 
gunpowder taken from the imperial arsenal to protect the Mediterranean once 
again, we are reminded that 1770 did not mark the end of Ottoman attempts to 
protect its waters.
 Conclusions
After the war with Russia, muḥāfaẓa missions resumed at pre-war levels 
with between eight and ten galleons dispatched to the Mediterranean annu-
114   Virginia Aksan, “Ottoman Political Writing, 1768-1808,” International Journal of Middle 
East Studies 25 (1993): 53-69.
115   For example, BOA/C.BH.59/2760 (12 Rebiülevvel 1200 / 13 January 1786).
116   Gelina Harlaftis, “The ‘Eastern Invasion’: Greeks in Mediterranean Trade and Shipping in 
the Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Centuries” in Trade and Cultural Exchange, 223-252, 
esp. 235-241; Gelina Harlaftis and Sophia Laiou, “Ottoman State Policy in Mediterranean 
Trade and Shipping, c.1780-1820: The rise of the Greek-owned Ottoman merchant fleet” 
in Networks of Power in Modern Greece: Essays in Honour of John Campbell, ed. Mark 
Mazower (London, 2008), 1-44.
ally between the summers of 1774 and 1779.117 By that time, the Ottoman 
Mediterranean was once again threatened by European privateers, as the 
British and French returned in force due to the conflict in North America, and 
the maritime regulations were brought back in an attempt to halt violence 
against Ottoman shipping and subjects.118 Once again, British privateers and 
warships committed grave attacks against Ottoman merchants and pilgrims, 
which, in the aftermath of British logistical support for the Russian navy prior 
to Çeşme, severely strained British-Ottoman relations. Older threats also 
remained as evidenced by the Maltese corsair ship captured in 1779 with four-
teen slaves taken and the Maniot pirate ship seized by the forces of Ahmed 
Paşa (al-Jazzar), the governor of northern Palestine, with fifty-three slaves sent 
to Istanbul in 1780.119 
At the beginning of the 1780s, therefore, many of the same problems that 
had troubled the Ottomans in the Mediterranean at the beginning of the 1720s 
remained. The Aegean Islands, the coasts of the Levantine provinces, and 
Ottoman ships and goods on the open sea were still vulnerable to attack from 
Maltese corsairs, Morean pirates, or, during inter-European conflict, British 
and French privateers. In assessing the success of Ottoman efforts to protect 
the Mediterranean through muḥāfaẓa patrols by the imperial fleet, it would 
seem that there is little positive to say. Yet, Ottoman attempts to use the navy 
to secure the safety of Ottoman trade and littoral populations reveal a num-
ber of important aspects of the relationship between the central authorities 
in Istanbul and local notables, commanders, judges, and subjects in the prov-
inces. Whilst many of the salaries of the ships’ crew and commanders was paid 
through ocaḳlıḳ using resources in provincial treasuries and tax-farms, the lion’s 
share of provisions, munitions, and payments came from the imperial trea-
sury, dockyard, armory, arsenal, kitchen, and customs house. The investment 
of the Ottoman state in protecting the islands and coasts of the Mediterranean 
saw a huge amount of money, food, and arms directed to the imperial fleet. 
At the same time, the state was able to rely on local notables and merchants 
to provide ships for muḥāfaẓa service. This intertwined relationship between 
the center and the provinces was given a further, deeper layer of dependency, 
117   BOA/C.BH.62/2916 (27 Ramazan 1188 / 1 December 1774); C.BH.152/7261 (7 Safer 1190 / 
28 March 1776); C.BH.225/11810 (23 Safer 1191 / 2 April 1777) C.BH.68/3327 (22 Rebiülahir 
1193 / 9 May 1779).
118   BOA/C.HR.118/5877 (20 Safer 1193 / 9 March 1779).
119   BOA/C.BH.199/9329 (17 Rebiülevvel 1193 / 5 April 1779); C.AS.949/41175 (end of Zilhicce 
1193 / beginning of January 1780).
as witnessed in the complaints, petitions, and pleas for assistance from local 
authorities and merchants for protection from seaborne violence.120 
The documentary evidence from the workings of the Ottoman state show 
the construction of this strategy of regular naval patrols and evolving legis-
lation from the late seventeenth century and particularly in the aftermath of 
Passarowitz, becoming a firm and regular feature of Ottoman efforts by the 1740s, 
and showing the defeat at Çeşme in 1770 not as a breaking point but as a set-
back from which the patterns established soon recovered and resumed. As well 
as showing that the problems the Ottoman state faced at sea at the end of the 
1710s were still present by the end of the 1770s, this period also  demonstrates 
the persistence of the Ottoman response to the eighteenth-century manifesta-
tion of the Northern Invasion, as well as other endemic threats from the wider 
Mediterranean, through these developing structures and practices of protection. 
The growing investment in muḥāfaẓa patrols from the late 1730s was a legacy of 
earlier conflicts with the Venetians and Habsburgs in seeking to actively define 
maritime space, as well as a response to ongoing corsair attacks. However, one of 
the driving factors was the huge amount of violence perpetrated by müsteʾmin 
privateers during the War of the Austrian Succession and Seven Years’ War. 
In the almost thirty years between the Treaty of Belgrade in 1739 and the out-
break of war with Russia at the end of 1768, the Ottoman Mediterranean was 
subjected to fifteen years of violence committed by European privateers. This 
led to the solidification of the maritime regulations as a legal means to pros-
ecute European attacks that affected Ottoman shipping through the imperial 
commands of 1744 and 1758, as well the strengthening of fortifications and gar-
rison strength in island and coastal defenses. But it was the regular presence of 
the imperial fleet that provided a visible Ottoman response to these bursts of 
European privateering, as well to more endemic maritime threats. 
This analysis of protective naval missions in the mid-eighteenth century 
therefore reveals a considered—if not entirely successful—attempt by the 
Ottoman state to assert maritime territoriality in the Mediterranean through 
the regular presence of imperial ships patrolling the islands and coastal waters, 
as well as the wider sea, to protect shipping and settlements from attack. This 
was due to a combination of a number of factors: developing notions of territo-
riality following the treaties of Carlowitz, Passarowitz, and Belgrade; petitions 
120   In some ways, this mirrors Ottoman attempts to secure authority in the provinces in the 
sixteenth century, creating a balance of dependency between the imperial center and 
provincial centers. See: Emrah Safa Gürkan, “The Centre and the Frontier: Ottoman 
Cooperation with the North African Corsairs in the Sixteenth Century,” Turkish Historical 
Review 1 (2010): 125-163, especially 156-160.
for assistance from the provinces; a need to maintain the passage of food staples 
at a time of frequent shortages; and ongoing threats to trade from a number 
of internal and external parties. The significant investment of ships, men, and 
supplies in this attempt to guard and protect the Mediterranean shows that 
the Ottoman state took the job of muḥāfaẓa seriously, and that the Ottoman 
navy was far from an impotent force in the eighteenth century. The evidence of 
legal and military measures coming from the Ottoman authorities challenges 
the idea that the Ottoman state retreated from the end of the sixteenth cen-
tury, and that it was unwilling and/or incapable of defensive action so that, 
to quote Eldem, it “abandon[ed the Mediterranean] to the  interaction—and 
conflicts—of those who had either the means or the need to fill in the vacuum 
it had created: fledgling pirates, local navigators under the growing threat of 
foreign competition, and, of course, French and other western navies which 
were gradually taking control of this no man’s land.”121 Ottoman patrols in the 
Mediterranean, as well as the extraordinary legal measures of the maritime 
regulations, indicate to the contrary that there was no retreat or abandonment 
but rather an increasing investment of money, stores, and diplomacy into pro-
tecting Ottoman littoral space and maritime trade that even the disaster at 
Çeşme failed to hinder. Further comparative research within and without the 
Ottoman realms needs to be undertaken to better understand the Ottoman 
relationship with its waters in this crucial period. But for now, the notion of 
muḥāfaẓa in the eighteenth century Mediterranean shows that Ottoman 
maritime space and Ottoman maritime policies played a key role in cement-
ing evolving notions of imperial sovereignty and territoriality, in maintaining 
center-provincial interactions, and in regulating Ottoman-European relations. 
121   Greene, Catholic Pirates, 5; Eldem, “Strangers,” 52.
